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Abstract
Asset prices undergo long swings that revolve around benchmark levels. In currency markets,
uctuations involve real exchange rates that are highly persistent and that move in near-
parallel fashion with nominal rates. The inability to explain these two regularities with one
model has been called the purchasing power parity puzzle. In this paper, we trace the
puzzle to exchange rate modelersuse of the Rational Expectations Hypothesis.We show
that once imperfect knowledge is recognized, a monetary model is able to account for the
puzzle, as well as other salient features of the data, including the long-swings behavior of
exchange rates.
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1 Introduction
Like all assets that trade freely in markets, oating currencies tend to undergo long
swings that revolve around benchmark levels. This pattern is clearly evident in gure 1,
which shows that the German mark-US dollar exchange rate moves away from purchas-
ing power parity (PPP) for extended periods but eventually, at unpredictable moments
of time, undergoes sustained movements back toward parity.1 Most estimates of the
half-life of PPP deviations the number of years that a PPP deviation is expected to
decay by 50 percent are in the range of 3-5 years. Thus, while PPP deviations are
ultimately bounded, they are highly persistent. Researchers have also found that real
and nominal exchange rates move nearly one-for one over monthly or quarterly time
horizons, which implies that the short-term volatility of real exchange rates (and thus
of PPP deviations) is as high as the volatility of nominal exchange rates. Rogo¤ (1996,
2007) and others have pointed out that no single extant model of the open economy
provides a satisfactory account of both the high persistence of real exchange rates and
their near-parallel movement with nominal rates. The inability to explain these two
empirical regularities in the context of one model is referred to as the PPP puzzle.
Figure 1
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1The PPP exchange rate in gure 1 is based on the Big Mac PPP exchange rate reported in the
April 1990 issue of The Economist magazine (which was 1.96) and CPI-ination-rate di¤erentials from
the IMFs International Financial Statistics.
In this paper, we trace the PPP puzzle to exchange rate modelers use of the
Rational Expectations Hypothesis (REH) to represent forecasting behavior. Mar-
ket participants, policy makers, and economists themselves have imperfect knowledge
about the causal mechanism driving macroeconomic outcomes. We show that once
this fact is recognized, a traditional monetary model is able to account for the high
persistence of real exchange rates and their near-parallel movement with nominal rates.
The model also accounts for other salient features of the time series data, including
the tendency of exchange rates to undergo long swings away from and toward PPP.
Indeed, we resolve the PPP puzzle by modeling the long-swings behavior of currencies
on the basis of imperfect knowledge.
International macroeconomists have advanced two broad classes of REH monetary
models to account for exchange rate movements, those that assume all prices are fully
exible and those that rely on some type of nominal rigidity. Flexible-price monetary
models emphasize shocks to taste and technology.2 Because these shocks are thought
to be highly persistent, exible-price models are able to rationalize the slow adjustment
of real exchange rates. However, they are unable to account for the near-parallel move-
ment and high short-term volatility of real and nominal exchange rates.3 Moreover,
the tendency of real and nominal exchange rates to undergo long swings away from
and toward PPP is puzzling in the context of exible-price models. In discussing the
currency swings of the 1980s, Rudiger Dornbusch argued that [t]he events were too
large and the reversal too sharp and complete to allude to mystical shifts in tastes and
technology(Dornbusch, 1989, p. 415).
To explain the near-parallel movement of real and nominal exchange rates over the
short-term, most macroeconomists invoke the sticky-price model of Dornbusch (1976)
or one of its New Open Economy Macroeconomics (NOEM) formulations.4 With goods
prices that are largely rigid at a point in time, monetary shocks, which cause jumps
in the nominal exchange rate, imply comparable jumps in the real exchange rate.
However, in these models, PPP deviations tend to dampen at a rate that is rigidly tied
to the degree of price stickiness. Consequently, the large half-life estimates found in
the literature are puzzling in the context of REH sticky-price models; no one believes
that the adjustment in goods markets is so slow as to take 3-5 years to get only halfway
2See Stockman (1980, 1987), Lucas (1982), Helpman (1981), and Svensson (1985).
3For quantitative studies, see Cardia (1991) and Miller and Todd (1995).
4The seminal work in the NOEM literature is Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995, 1996, 1998, 2000). See
also Svensson and Wijnbergen (1989), Betts and Devereux (1996, 2000).
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back to equilibrium.5
Indeed, empirical evidence shows that goods prices adjust much more quickly. En-
gel and Morley (2001) report half-life estimates for price adjustment as small as one
quarter, whereas for the real exchange rate they nd the usual half-life estimates of
3-5 years. Frydman, et al. (2008) use the I(2) framework of Johansen (1997, 2006)
to estimate a VECM for the German mark-US dollar market. They nd that PPP
deviations have a half-life of ve years, while goods-market adjustment has a half-life
of two months.6
This evidence reveals that a resolution of the PPP puzzle requires a de-linking of real
exchange rate movements from the adjustment of goods prices. However, the reliance
of extant models on REH severely limits their ability to accomplish this objective.
By design, the causal variables and the parameters of an REH representation of an
individuals forecasting strategy are derivative of a models specications of preferences,
constraints, and the processes governing the causal variables.7 Thus, reliance on REH
forces economists to seek explanations of the PPP puzzle by altering specications of
the non-expectational components of their models.8
In a recent attempt to resolve the PPP puzzle in a sticky-price REH model, Benigno
(2004) shows that the adjustments of the real exchange rate and goods prices can be de-
linked by endogenizing monetary policy.9 In his calibration exercises, Benigno assumes
a reasonable degree of price stickiness, but he also makes several special assumptions.10
5Quatitative studies of sticky-price monetary models show that the degree of price rigidity needed
to generate enough persistence is much too high to be plausible. See Kollman (2001), Bergin and
Feenstra (1999), and Chari, Kehoe, and McGratten (2000).
6Cheung, Lai, and Bergman (2004) also estimate a VECM and nd faster speeds of adjustment in
goods markets.
7The causal variables that enter an REH representation of forecasting behavior are limited to those
that the economist uses in representing the non-expectational components of his model. Moreover,
the parameters of this representation are restricted to be particular functions of the parameters of
the models specications of preferences and constraints and the way that the policy and other causal
variables unfold through time.
8The severe di¢ culties in searching for alternative explanations of time-series data on the basis of
REH models are not limited to the PPP puzzle. For example, Mehra and Prescott (1985) pointed out
that REH models are unable to explain the large magnitude of the equity premium the historical-
average return on stocks over risk-free bonds. In their quest to resolve this equity premiuim puzzle,
REH theorists have searched for increasingly more special specications of preferences. See Epstein
and Zin (1989, 1991), Constantinides (1990), Campbell and Cochrane (1999), and Barberis, Huang,
and Santos (2001).
9See also Gali and Monacelli (2005), Engel and West (2006), and Engel, Mark, and West (2007).
10In Benignos model, the price-setting parameters are independent of the Taylor rule specication.
Rogo¤(2007) points out that it may be implausible to assume that these parameters remain unchanged
across the di¤erent settings of the policy reaction function used in the calibration exercise. Indeed,
3
He shows that the model implies a highly persistent stationary process for the real
exchange rate that can replicate the large half-life found in the data. However, despite
its special assumptions, the model does not quite match the observed volatility of the
real exchange rate, which is either too high or too low depending on the particular
parameter values used in the calibration.
Moreover, Benignos results reveal how calibration exercises obscure the failure of
the model to provide an adequate account of the time series data on exchange rates.11
Johansen et al. (2008) shows that the near-I(1) stationary, though persistent
processes generated by extant REH models are insu¢ ciently persistent to account for
the long-lasting currency swings and other empirical regularities during oating-rate
periods.
Johansen et al. (2008 develops new test procedures to allow for shifts in the deter-
ministic component and estimates a cointegrated I(2) model for goods prices, exchange
rates, and interest rates for Germany and the US.12 The paper shows that the I(2)
model characterizes the di¤erent levels of persistence in the data signicantly better
than its I(1) counterpart: the null hypothesis of I(1) is rejected in favor of I(2) for
relative goods prices, the nominal exchange rate, and short-term interest rates.13 They
also reject the hypothesis that the real exchange rate and the long-term interest rate
di¤erential are stationary; instead they nd that they are near-I(2) highly persistent
I(1) processes.14
The models of Begnino and others generate insu¢ cient persistence of the real ex-
change rate and other macroeconomic variables for reasons directly connected to their
reliance on REH. This representation rigidly ties individualsexchange rate forecasts
the references cited by Benigno himself (see page 496) report a wide range of estimates for the interest
rate smoothing parameter and are strongly suggestive of its instability. In order to generate higher
persistence in the real exchange rate, Beningo also makes use of other special assumptions. For
example, he must assume that the degree of price adjusment di¤ers across domestic and foreign rms
within the same country.
11For forceful arguments against the use of calibration methods as a substitute for standard statis-
tical inference in testing economic models, see Sims (1996).
12For an extensive discussion and analysis of cointegrated VAR models, see Juselius (2006).
13The new test procedures build on previous work in Johansen (1992, 1995, 1997, 2006), Rahbek et
al. (1999), Paruolo (2000, 2002), Nielsen and Rahbek (2000).
14We also show that imposing the I(1) structure on the data signicantly distorts information.
These conclusions are consistent with several other studies that nd I(2) trends in time-series data
on, for example, exchange rates, goods prices, and money supplies. See, Johansen (1992), Juselius
(1994), Kongsted (2003, 2005), Kongsted and Nielsen (2004), and Bacchiocchi and Fanelli (2005).
Using the alternative methodology of spectral analysis, Jung (2007, p.383) nds a dramatic failure
of the [NOEM] model [to explain] business cycle frequency uctuation in exchange rates.
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to PPP; individuals invariably predict a tendency of the exchange rate to revert back
to this benchmark. Consequently, the exchange rate tends to revert back to PPP fol-
lowing a jump, in say, the money supply. Exogenous shocks can push the exchange rate
away from PPP over successive time periods. Under REH, these shocks are necessarily
uncorrelated over time. Thus, individualsforecasts and, therefore, the exchange rate
can move away from parity over successive time periods if realizations of these shocks
just happen to be of the same sign and of su¢ ciently large magnitude. However, the
long lasting runs of random shocks that would be needed to explain the duration and
magnitude of the long swings in exchange rates are too improbable. This is precisely
why the statistical analysis of Johansen et al. (2008) rejects the stationary near-I(1)
hypothesis in favor of a highly persistent near-I(2) process for the real exchange rate.15
As Rudiger Dornbusch and Je¤rey Frankel put it, the chief problem with the over-
shooting theory, indeed, with the more general rational expectations approach, is that
it does not explain well the [long-swings] dynamics in exchange rates(Dornbusch and
Frankel, 1995, p. 16).16
This leads us to replace REH with an imperfect knowledge economics (IKE) rep-
resentation of individualsforecasting behavior in a monetary model. In this model,
which is developed in Frydman and Goldberg (2007) (the FG model), individualsex-
change rate forecasts are no longer rigidly tied to the other components preferences,
constraints, and policy variables of the model. This independent role for expecta-
tions delivers the extra persistence that is missing in REH models. However, it does
so without presuming that individuals behave irrationally, as is the case in non-REH
behavioral models. The FG and other IKE models avoid this presumption by recogniz-
ing that rational individuals in a world of imperfect knowledge revise their forecasting
strategies, at least intermittently, over time and by modeling this change with math-
ematical conditions that are qualitative. As we show in this paper, although the FG
model is based on qualitative conditions that do not prespecify exactly how an individ-
ual may change her forecast from one point in time to another, it nevertheless generates
testable implications.
15See also Evans (1986) and Engel and Hamilton (1990), which show that the persistence stemming
solely from the cumulation of random shocks bu¤eting the model cannot account for the curency
swings we observe.
16The inability of standard monetary models to explain long swings in exchange rates has led
international macroeconomists to rely on the REH bubble paths of sticky-price models. However,
Frydman and Goldberg (2007, chapter 7) point out that the bubble paths of REH monetary models,
as with their fundamental solutions, are inconsistent with key features of the long swings we actually
observe in currency markets.
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In the FG model, persistent swings in the exchange rate away from PPP occur
because market participants have only imperfect knowledge about the mechanism that
relates the exchange rate to a set of causal variables. Moreover, these swings are
ultimately self-limiting; eventually, if the divergence from PPP were to become large
enough, market participants would revise their forecasting strategies or policy makers
would alter policy in ways that would trigger a sustained movement back toward parity.
The ability of the FG model to generate protracted currency swings, and thus
highly persistent PPP deviations, does not depend on how quickly goods prices adjust
to equilibrium levels. In the model, currency swings away from PPP arise not because
of sticky goods prices, but because market participants exchange rate forecasts, in
the aggregate, tend to move persistently away from parity over some time periods.
We show that such movements in individuals forecasts de-links real exchange rate
persistence in the model from the speed of nominal price adjustment. In fact, even if
we assume that goods prices are fully exible, the model continues to imply long-swings
behavior and a large half-life of PPP deviations. The model is thus able to generate a
highly persistent real exchange rate without the odd conclusion that goods prices also
adjust very slowly. We show that even when goods prices are exible, the model is also
consistent with the near-parallel movement of the nominal and real exchange rate over
the short-term.
Although the FG model of currency markets di¤ers sharply from its extant counter-
parts in stopping short of fully prespecifying market participantsforecasting strategies,
it nevertheless generates testable empirical implications. The model implies that the
real exchange rate follows a random walk with a temporally unstable drift. The qual-
itative conditions used in the model to represent revisions of forecasting strategies
restrict the way the unstable drifts unfold over time. Frydman et al. (2008) show
that these conditions are su¢ cient to characterize the real exchange rate as a highly
persistent near-I(2). In the present paper, we show that this IKE-based real exchange
rate process implies a large half-life as typically dened in the literature. Our analysis
derives an estimate of the half-life based on the usual AR(1) specication. Thus, FGs
IKE model resolves the PPP puzzle: it accounts for both the high persistence of real
exchange rates and their near-parallel movement with nominal rates.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we sketch a
sticky-price monetary model due to Dornbusch (1976) and Frankel (1979) and show
that it generates stationary but persistent processes for real and nominal exchange
6
rates and goods prices. Section 3 shows how endogenizing monetary policy de-links
real exchange rate movements from goods prices under REH. Section 4 introduces the
IKE approach to modeling revisions of forecasting strategies and shows how the FG
model implies long swings in the nominal and real exchange rate even with fully exible
goods prices. In section 5, we show that these currency swings are characterized by
PPP deviations with a large half-life. Section 6 concludes with remarks concerning the
empirical implications of our IKE resolution of the puzzle.
2 Puzzling Behavior in REH Sticky-Price Models
We begin by sketching the well-known di¢ culties of the traditional overshooting model
of Dornbusch (1976) in resolving the PPP puzzle. In response to these problems, in-
ternational macroeconomists have altered the non-expectational features of traditional
sticky-price models, including NOEMs introduction of explicit intertemporal micro-
foundations or endogenizing monetary policy. The literature has largely sidestepped
what Dornbusch and Frankel (1995) conjectured may be the key problem with exchange
rate models: it may not stem from particular assumptions concerning price adjustment,
policy reaction, or other non-expectational components, but with the reliance on REH
to represent forecasting behavior.
In this section, we trace the inability of the overshooting model and its modications
to provide a plausible resolution of the PPP puzzle to REH.17 The Benigno (2004)
model de-links real exchange rate movements from the adjustment of goods prices and,
under some conditions, produces near-unit root representations for the real exchange
rate. But, REH representations do not generate enough persistence to adequately
account for the frequency with which currencies tend to undergo large and long lasting
swings away from parity.
2.1 The Overshooting Model
Consider the following stochastic version of the two-country, sticky-price monetary
model due to Dornbusch (1976) and Frankel (1979):
mt = pt + yt   it (1)
17More broadly, Frydman and Goldberg (2007) argue that the empirical di¢ culties of REH models in
explaining prices and risk in asset markets can be traced ultimately to the fundamental epistemological
aws of REH as a way to model forecasting behavior.
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bstjt+1   st = it (2)
pt+1 =  [ (st   pt   qppp)   (it   ^t)] + Etpt+1 (3)
mt = 
m +mt 1 + vmt and yt = 
y + yt 1 + v
y
t (4)
where st is the domestic currency price of foreign exchange, mt, pt, yt, and it denote
the relative (domestic minus foreign) level of money supplies, good prices, income
levels, and nominal interest rates, respectively, bstjt+1 denotes an aggregate of market
participants point forecasts of the future exchange rate conditional on individuals
information sets and forecasting strategies, qppp denotes the relative PPP level of the
real exchange rate, which we assume to be constant,18 ^t is the markets assessment
concerning the steady-state relative rate of ination, m and y are drifts, which are
typically assumed to be constant, vmt and v
y
t are mutually uncorrelated, mean-zero,
i.i.d. errors,  is the rst-di¤erence operator, and an overbar denotes a steady-state
value. Variables except for it and ^t are expressed in log-levels.
Equations (1)-(4) are well known and we o¤er little discussion of them. We note
that the specication of price adjustment in equation (3), which depends on excess
demand (the term in square brackets) and the expectation of the secular trend, assumes
imperfect substitutability between domestic and foreign goods.19 As such, equilibrium
in the domestic and foreign goods markets is given by
st   pt   qppp = 

(it   ^t) (5)
This specication shows that goods market clearing implies a relationship between the
real exchange rate and real interest rate. Traditional sticky price models represent bstjt+1
and ^t with REH. This representation leads to the well known result that the models
steady state is characterized by international Fisher parity (that is, it   ^t = 0), and
thus PPP. The short-run dynamics of the model is then anchored to this steady state.
By design, REH species individualsforecasts of the aggregate variables and the
predictions of the model on the aggregate level to be one and the same. Because goods
prices are sticky, an unanticipated monetary shock, vmt , causes a jump in both the
18Dornbusch (1976), Frankel (1979), and many others assume absolute PPP, thereby setting qPPP =
0. However, price levels across countries are based on di¤erent baskets of goods and services. In
general, then, qPPP 6= 0.
19Mussa (1982) and Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1984) have pointed out that the specication in equa-
tion (3) ignores anticipated disturances. Because this issue plays no role in our analysis, we follow
Dornbusch (1976) and others and ignore it.
8
nominal and real exchange rate away from PPP. The resulting excess demand and
excess supply in the domestic and foreign goods markets, respectively, cause pt to
move back toward PPP, thereby reducing the disequilibria.
Under REH, the model ties its prediction of the change in the nominal exchange rate
to the adjustment of goods prices. It predicts, therefore, that the nominal exchange
rate tends to move back to PPP at every point in time:
st+1 = 1 (s
re
t   st) + ^re + vst+1 (6)
where the steady-state values sret = p
re
t + q
PPP = spppt , ^
re = Epre = Esre =
m   y, pret = mt   yt + ^re imply PPP and international Fisher parity, vst+1 =
1+1
1
 
vmt+1   vyt+1

is a mean zero, i.i.d. error, 0 < 1 < 1 is one minus the stable
root of the system,20 and the superscript redenotes an REH representation. Con-
sequently, REH constrains individualspoint forecasts of the exchange rate to imply
a movement back toward PPP at every point in time according to the following xed
rule:
bsretjt+1   st = 1 (sret   st) + ^re (7)
A similar equation holds for relative goods prices:
pt+1 = 1 (pt   pt) + ^re (8)
Since qt = st   pt, equations (7) and (8) imply the following REH representation for
the real exchange rate:
qt+1 = 1 (q
ppp   qt) + vst+1 (9)
For countries in which secular trends in goods prices are small relative to money and
income shocks, the representations in (6) and (9) imply near-parallel movements of the
nominal and real exchange rates. Thus, the model is consistent with the nding that the
short-term conditional volatilities of real and nominal exchange rates are of comparable
magnitudes. However, the very features of the model that deliver this implication make
it di¢ cult to rationalize a large half-life of real exchange rate movements.
20One minus the stable root 1 =
(+)
2 +
[( (+) +
4
 )]
2 > 0. It is usual to assume that goods
prices do not adjust fast enough to imply oscillatory behavior, that is, 1 > 1. The required condition
is  < (1+)+ .
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To see this, we take the time-t expectation of equations (8) and (9):
Et(pt+1   pt+1)
pt   pt =
Et(qt+1   qppp)
qt   qppp =  1 (10)
These expressions show that the trend rates of adjustment of goods prices to equilibrium
levels and the real exchange rate to PPP are one and the same. The vast majority
of empirical estimates of 1 imply a half-life of PPP deviations in the range of 3-5
years. Thus, for the traditional sticky-price model to be consistent with the time
series evidence, goods prices would have to adjust unreasonably sluggishly to their
equilibrium levels following a monetary disturbance.
2.2 De-linking Goods Prices From the Real Exchange Rate
Under REH
The failure of the traditional sticky price model to explain both the high persistence
and high volatility of the real exchange rate makes clear that a model capable of
accounting for both of these ndings must de-link real exchange rate movements from
the adjustment of goods prices. Because REH species bsretjt+1 as an output of rather
than an input to an economists model, de-linking requires a modication of the non-
expectational components of the model.
Benigno (2004) shows that such a de-linking can be accomplished if the overshoot-
ing model is reformulated as a NOEM model with Calvo (1983) price adjustment and
endogenous monetary policy. The models use of a Taylor-type reaction function allows
for interest rate smoothing. Engel, Mark and West (2007) (EMW) construct a simpli-
ed version of this model and show that the real exchange rate is proportional to the
policy errors of the domestic monetary authority relative to its foreign counterpart:21
qt   qppp = cut (11)
where ut denotes the relative policy error and c depends inversely on the degree of price
sluggishness; if prices are assumed to be perfectly exible, c = 0.
Equation (11) shows that real exchange rate persistence can occur if goods prices are
to some extent sluggish and the relative policy error is itself persistent. For example,
EMW suppose that ut evolves according to:
21EMW build on Galí and Monacelli (2005), and Engel and West (2006). They show that their
simplied model captures the key features of the Beningo model.
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ut = ut 1 + t (12)
where 0 <  < 1 and t is mean zero, i.i.d.. This, in turn, implies the following real
exchange rate equation:
qt+1 = (  1) (qt   qppp) + ct+1 (13)
Thus, if policy errors are persistent enough, that is,  is close to unity, the real exchange
rate will be characterized by a large half-life. Moreover, because the parameter that
represents the degree of price sluggishness enters only through c in this model, the
real exchange rate is completely de-linked from the speed of price adjustment. Thus,
the model can account for a persistent real exchange rate without implying that goods
prices adjust unreasonably sluggishly.
However, the EMW and Benigno models sketched in this section su¤er from the
same basic aw as the original overshooting model: they do not produce su¢ cient
persistence to explain the currency swings we actually observe in markets. Equation
(9) shows that, even if goods prices were assumed to be very sluggish, the original
overshooting model would produce at best a near-unit root (near-I(1)) process. Equa-
tion (13) shows that this is also the case for NOEM models with some, not necessarily
large, price sluggishness and endogenous monetary policy. A near-I(1) variable trends
stochastically, that is, undergoes successive movements in the same direction, because
realizations of the exogenous errors (vst+1 or t+1) just happen to be su¢ ciently large
and of the same sign for several time periods.
The insu¢ cient persistence generated by near-I(1) models is apparent when one
considers uctuations in the U.S. dollar markets for the euro, British pound, and
Japanese yen. These markets, which are the largest, are each characterized by at least
one swing in qt away from PPP that lasts 3 years or more and that involves departures
from PPP of more than 40 percent in every decade of oating (the 1970s, 1980s, 1990s,
2000s).22 It is clear that the frequency and magnitude of these swings are too great
to be explained by a stationary process, even if near-I(1). Not surprisingly, Johansen
et al. (2008) rejects the stationary near-I(1) hypothesis in favor of a highly persistent
near-I(2) process for the real exchange rate. As we mentioned in the introduction, other
studies, which include Evans (1986), Engel and Hamilton (1990), and Jung (2007), also
22See Frydman and Goldberg (2007), which use the German mark prior to the intoduction of the
euro in January 1999.
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nd that the I(1) class of models provides an inadequate account of the currency swings
we actually observe.
3 Recognizing Imperfect Knowledge
In the remainder of this paper, we build on Frydman and Goldberg (2007, 2008) and
pursue an alternative explanation of uctuations that accounts for long swings and that
resolves the PPP puzzle. To this end, we drop REH and the constraint that individuals
exchange rate forecasts are rigidly anchored to the models other components. We show
how forecast revisions provide an additional source of persistence in the real exchange
rate that by design is missing from REH models.
In real-world markets, individuals have imperfect knowledge of the causal mecha-
nism driving outcomes. Economists themselves have constructed many di¤erent mod-
els. Thus, the aggregate of market participantsforecasting strategies di¤ers from the
strategy that is implied by any one REH model. We show that departures of bstjt+1 frombsretjt+1 lead to a de-linking of trend changes in the real exchange rate from the speed of
adjustment in goods markets. Moreover, unlike in the overshooting and NOEM mod-
els, movements of bstjt+1 can involve extended swings away from PPP that are followed
by persistent movements back toward parity. This feature of the IKE model enables us
to account for the long-lasting currency swings that are characteristic of oating-rate
regimes. We show in section 5 that the added persistence that comes from such swings
leads to a real exchange rate process that exhibits a large half-life without the odd
conclusion that goods prices adjust too slowly.
3.1 An Individuals Forecasting Strategy
In order to formalize what we mean by imperfect knowledge, we begin with the following
general representation of an individuals point forecast of the exchange rate:
bsitjt+1 = ^itxit + ^ist (14)
where the vector xit and st represent the variables that individual i uses in forming her
forecasts and ^
i
t and ^
i are the parameters that she attaches to these variables.23
We refer to the parameters ^
i
t and ^
i, the composition of the causal variables, xit,
and the probability distribution of these variables as the structure of an economists
23Relaxing the assumption of a constant ^i does not alter the main conclusions of the analysis. See
chapter 14 in Frydman and Goldberg (2007).
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representation of forecasting behavior. An economist formalizes his assumptions on
how an individual forms and revises her forecasting strategies with restrictions that
constrain the structure of (14) and its change. That much is common to all extant
approaches to modeling forecasting behavior, including REH, behavioral, and IKE
models.
In this paper, we assume that the causal variables in (14), like mt and yt, follow
random walks with drift. This enables us to focus on the role of revisions of forecasting
strategies in driving uctuations in the model.24
As for changes in the structure of the representation in (14), the vast majority of
economists construct models that disregard the fact that individuals in real-world -
nancial markets revise their forecasting strategies, at least intermittently; these models
impute to market participants exactly the same forecasting strategy at every point in
time. The overshooting and NOEM models of the preceding section impose this invari-
ance restriction and thus constrain the structure of (14) to be the same for each t.25
Moreover, because these models represent forecasting strategies with REH, they select
the causal variables and parameters to ensure consistency between their predictions
on the aggregate and individual levels: xit includes only those variables given by the
economists own semi-reduced-form model and ^
i
t and ^
i are particular functions of
the parameters of this model. For example, in the overshooting model sketched above,
xit = [mt yt ^
re qppp], ^
i
=
h
1 1 1 + 1 1
i
, and ^i = 1  1 for all i.
However, in a world of imperfect knowledge, market participants make use of diverse
strategies to forecast future market outcomes. At each point in time, for example, some
individuals may well base their exchange rate forecasts solely on the PPP exchange rate.
But, this variable is merely one of many fundamental factors that a market participant
might reasonably rely on in forming her forecast. Thus, the structure that adequately
represents an individuals forecasting strategy di¤ers from the one implied by an REH
model, that is, bsitjt+1 6= bsretjt+1.
24A more complete analysis of the monetary model under imperfect knowledge would allow for
changes in the mt, yt, and xt processes.
25Such invariance characterizes not only conventional REH representations, but also most of the
extant behavioral representations of forecasting behavior. For references and a formal analysis of
this striking similarity between REH and behavioral models, see chapters 4 and 6 in Frydman and
Goldberg (2007).
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3.1.1 Trend Changes in an Individuals Point Forecast
Prot-seeking motivates rational participants in nancial markets to nd new ways
to forecast future outcomes; how and when they revise their forecasting strategies is
to some extent non-routine. Indeed, the decision to revise ones strategy depends on
many factors, including prior forecasting success, economic and political developments,
emotions, or, as we will suggest shortly, the size of the departure of the exchange rate
from PPP.26
The representation in (14) represents revisions of forecasting strategies through
their impact on the semi-reduced-form component of an individuals forecast, which
we denote by bsaitjt+1 = ^itxit.27 The total change in this forecast between consecutive
points of time can be written as:
bsa;itjt+1   bsa;it 1jt = ^itxit + ^it 1xit (15)
where revisions of ^
i
t are assumed to involve jumps at a point in time. Thus, ^
i
t =
^
i
t   ^
i
t 1 6= 0 represents a change at time t. Because the PPP puzzle is cast in terms
of the rates at which goods prices and the real exchange rate tend toward particular
values, we need to decompose the total change in (15) into a trend change, which we
denote by T bsaitjt+1, and random deviations from this trend change. If we were to impose
the invariance restriction on the model, so that ^
i
t = 0 for all t, the total change inbsaitjt+1 could be written as:
bsa;itjt+1   bsa;it 1jt = T bsaitjt+1 + ^ixit (16)
where T bsaitjt+1 = ^ixi, which is equal to the time t 1 expectation ofbsa;itjt+1 conditional
on no change in ^
i
t at time t, that is, Et 1
h
bsa;itjt+1j^it = 0i, and xi and xit are the
drift and errors of the xit process, respectively.
28 In this case, the trend change in bsaitjt+1
would be constant and only stem from the drifts in the causal variables.
26Nonetheless, IKE holds out the possibility that individual decision making does display some
regularity. But, that this regularity can at best be captured with qualitative conditions. See below
for a formal representation.
27In general, IKE allows for the set of variables that are used for forcasting to change over time.
The specication in (15) allows for such behavior dening xit to include all of the variables used at
evry point in time and setting some of the parameters in ^
i
t to zero.
28Consequently, in the case of an invariant structure, T bsaitjt+1 = Et 1bsa;itjt+1, where the expectation
is conditional on a xed ^
i
and time t  1 information.
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Once we recognize that market participantsand economistsknowledge is imper-
fect, the trend change in (16) varies over time; it depends on how the structure of the
representation changes, that is, on ^
i
t. This trend change is given by
T bsaitjt+1 = ^itxit + Et 1 hbsa;itjt+1j^it = 0i (17)
where we note that both ^
i
tx
i
t and Et 1
h
bsa;itjt+1j^t = 0i = ^it 1xi vary over time.29
To derive any implications for time-series data, an economist must impose restric-
tions on the way an individuals forecasting strategy unfolds over time, that is, on the
two components of its trend change, T bsaitjt+1. IKE does so by imposing only qualitative
constraints on ^
i
t. But, what we show next is that even if we fully prespecify the
imperfection of knowledge, the model implies a de-linking of qt and pt.
3.2 A De-linking of the Real Exchange Rate From Goods
Prices
We now show that jettisoning REH opens new channels for de-linking trend changes in
qt from the adjustment of pt to equilibrium. To simplify our analysis, we assume that
individualsxits include only exogenous variables.
30 This assumption, together with
equations (1)-(4) and (14), imply the following equations of motion:31
zt+1 = # (zt   zt) + Et
h
zt+1j^t+1 = 0
i
+ Jt+1 (18)
29It may seem natural to dene T bsaitjt+1 not as in (17), but as ^it xit 1 + xi + ^it 1xi . This
alternative formulation, however, is not a trend change because^
i
t and 
xi
t are, in general, correlated.
As such, deviations from this alternative formulation are not random and do not have mean zero.
30Relaxing this assumption, as with a constant ^i, does not alter the main conclusions of the analysis.
See Frydman and Goldberg (2007, chapter 14).
31Because goods prices are assumed to be rigid at a point in time, we replace Etpt+1 with
Et
h
pt+1j^t+1 = 0
i
in equation (3).
15
where zt =
h
st pt it qt
i
, 0 < # = [+(1 ^)(+)]
(1 ^) < 1 is one minus the root of the
system,32 Jt is a matrix of jump terms.
Jt =
2666664
1
(1 ^)
h
vmt+1   vyt+1 + 

^t
x
t+1 +^t+1xt+1
i
0
1

 
vmt+1   vyt+1

1
(1 ^)
h
vmt+1   vyt+1 + 

^t
x
t+1 +^t+1xt+1
i
3777775 (19)
which are analogous to vst+1 in equation (6), but now recognize that ^t can change at
a point in time, and the steady-state (goods-market-clearing) values are
st = s
re
t +
 + 
G
bsatjt+1   bsreatjt+1 (20)
pt = p
re
t +

G
bsatjt+1   bsreatjt+1 (21)
qt = q
ppp +

G
bsatjt+1   bsreatjt+1 (22)
it = ^ +

G
bsatjt+1   bsreatjt+1 (23)
such that G =  + (1  ^) ( + ) > 0, bsatjt+1 = ^txt and bsreatjt+1 are the semi-reduced-
form parts of bstjt+1 and bsretjt+1, respectively, and ^ is assumed to be constant33. The
vector xt and st represent the union of variables that individuals use in forming their
forecasts and ^t and ^t are weighted averages of the parameters that they attach to
these variables.34
Like in the overshooting model, the time paths in (18)-(23) depend on a short-run
adjustment term, a steady-state (goods-market clearing) level, and, except for the pt
equation, jump terms. Moreover, this dynamic system is also one dimensional, implying
that in the absence of further exogenous shocks and revisions of forecasting strategies
(that is, Jt+1 = 0), the real exchange rate and goods prices, as well as all of the other
32Like with REH, we assume that if goods prices are sluggish, their speed of adjustment is not too
fast to imply oscillatory behavior, that is, # < 1. See footnote 20.
33From equation (7), bsreatjt+1 = (1  ^) sret + ^re, where we replace  with 1  ^. Equations (20)-(23)
each omit a stationary term involving ^ and ^re that equals zero under REH. Also, equation (23)
omits a second constant term that also equals zero under REH. See Frydman and Goldberg (2007).
The assumption of a constant ^ enables us to highlight the role of exchange rate expectations in
driving currency swings. A more complete analysis would consider alternative specications for ^.
34Frydman and Goldberg (2007) use wealth shares as aggregation weights.
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endogenous variables of the system, revert back to their steady-state levels at the same
rate, #:
Et
h
(pt+1   pt+1) j^t+1 = 0
i
pt   pt =
Et
h
(qt+1   qt+1) j^t+1 = 0
i
qt   qt =  # (24)
Thus, jettisoning REH does not lead to di¤ering speeds at which pt and qt respond
to departures from steady-state values. Although the EMW and Benigno modications
of the overshooting model imply that these speeds di¤er, they share a key feature with
their overshooting predecessor: steady-state values imply PPP.
In sharp contrast, equations (20)-(23) show that this is not the case once REH is
abandoned. In a world of imperfect knowledge, bsatjt+1 inuences st and pt di¤erently.35
Consequently, qt = st   pt also depends on individualsexchange rate forecasts; move-
ments of bsatjt+1 relative to bsreatjt+1 cause qt to move either away from or toward PPP
levels.
It is not di¢ cult to understand the intuition behind departures of the models
steady-state values from PPP. Once one recognizes imperfect knowledge, goods market
equilibrium in (5) no longer implies PPP. An increase in bsatjt+1, for example, leads
market participants to bid up st. This domestic currency depreciation does create
excess demand for domestic goods and a rise in relative goods prices. But, pt increases
less than one-for-one with st because money market equilibrium requires a rise in it;
with imperfect substitutability between domestic and foreign goods ( 6= 0), the rise
in it helps to restore goods-market equilibrium. Under imperfect knowledge, then, the
changes in the steady-state values of the model are inconsistent with PPP. Instead,
they involve increases in both the real exchange rate, st  pt, and the real interest rate,
it   ^t.36
With steady-state values no longer rigidly tied to PPP, the link found in the original
overshooting model between the rate at which the real exchange rate tends toward PPP
and the speed of adjustment in goods markets is broken.
35Equations (20)-(23) show that if all individuals somehow adhered to the REH forecasting strategy
endlessly (so that bsatjt+1 = bsreatjt+1 for all t), then their exchange rate forecasts would inuence st and
pt in a parallel way.
36In Frydman et al. ( 2008), we indeed nd evidence of an equilibrium relationship beyween the real
exchange rate and the real interest rate.
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3.2.1 Trend Changes in Goods Prices and the Real Exchange Rate
Under imperfect knowledge, the trend rate of change of the real exchange rate toward
qppp is not given by  #, but by
T (qt+1   qppp)
qt   qppp =
 # (qt   qt)
qt   qppp +
H (T qt+1)
qt   qppp =  t+1 (25)
where
H (T qt+1) = Et
h
qt+1j^t+1 = 0
i
+
G
(1  ^)

T qt+1   Et
h
qt+1j^t+1 = 0
i
This expression shows that the trend rate of change of qt toward PPP not only di¤ers
from  #, but this rate varies over time.37 Equation (25) also shows that departures of
qt from PPP break the link between  t+1 and # through two channels: the short-run
adjustment of the system and the trend change in the steady-state real exchange rate,
the rst and second terms in the expression, respectively.
By sharp contrast to its REH counterpart, both of these channels could imply a
tendency for the real exchange rate to move away from PPP at any point in time.
It is clear from equation (22) that depending on individualsexchange rate forecasts,
although qt may lie above qppp at a point in time, it may lie below its steady-state value,
qt. In this case, short-run adjustment would place upward pressure on qt to move away
from PPP in the ensuing period, that is,  #(qt qt)
qt qppp > 0. It is also clear that the trend
change in individualsexchange rate forecasts could also imply upward pressure on qt.
Thus, once one recognizes imperfect knowledge in a traditional sticky-price monetary
model, the trend rate of change of the real exchange rate is not only de-linked from the
speed of adjustment of goods prices, but this trend rate could imply further departures
from PPP.
The fact that the de-linking of  t+1 and # occurs through both the short-run and
steady-state components of the model implies that, unlike in the EMW and Benigno
models, the assumption of sticky goods prices is not needed for the result. In the
case of fully exible goods prices,  t+1 =
H(T qt+1)
qt qppp 6=  #. Thus, even without nominal
rigidities of any kind in the model,  t+1 could be positive and the real exchange rate
could tend to move away from PPP in any period.
37As in the overshooting model, if qt were to equal qppp at all t, T qt+1 would equal zero and  t
would be a constant and equal to  #.
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3.3 Parallel Movements of Nominal and Real Exchange Rates
Even With Flexible Goods Prices
The monetary model with imperfect knowledge is also consistent with near-parallel
movements of nominal and real exchange rates over the short term. International
macroeconomists often view such behavior as compelling evidence in favor of open-
economy models that assume nominal rigidities of some kind.38 However, once one
recognizes the imperfection of knowledge, the monetary model is compatible with near-
parallel movements of st and qt regardless of whether goods prices are assumed to be
sticky or exible.
Consider rst the sticky-price case. The equations for st and qt follow from the
system in (18) and are
st+1 = # (st   st) + Et
h
st+1j^t+1 = 0
i
+ J1t+1 (26)
qt+1 = # (qt   qt) + Et
h
qt+1j^t+1 = 0
i
+ J1t+1 (27)
where from equations (20) and (22) and the specication of bsatjt+1,
Et
h
st+1j^t+1 = 0
i
= ^re +
 + 
G

^t
x   (1  ^) ^re

(28)
Et
h
qt+1j^t+1 = 0
i
=

G

^t
x   (1  ^) ^re

(29)
and J1t+1 denotes the rst and fourth cells of the Jt+1 matrix in (19).
39
Like in the original overshooting model, shocks to the causal variables, which enter
the model through J1t, lead to one-for-one movements in st and qt. Equations (26) and
(27) show that this is also the case with revisions of forecasting strategies, which also
enter through J1t+1.
As before, the trend changes in st and qt conditional on no change in structure also
di¤er. With imperfect knowledge, this di¤erence depends on the size of  relative to
, that is, on the relative impacts of changes in the real exchange rate and real interest
rates on excess demand in the goods markets, respectively. If  is small relative to ,
which the literature on the J-curve suggests is true, then ^re will account for much of
38For example, see Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1996), chapter 9.
39We have used the fact that bsreatjt+1 = (1  ^) ^re. See footnote 33.
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the di¤erence between the trend changes in equations (28) and (29).40 As before, then,
if the secular trend in goods prices is modest, the sticky price monetary model under
imperfect knowledge implies near-parallel movements st and qt.
Such behavior also arises in the model under exible goods prices. In this case, the
time paths for the endogenous variables of the model are given by equations (20)-(23).
The equations for st and qt are
st+1 = ^
re +
 + 
G
 
bsat+1jt+2   (1  ^)  ^re + vmt+1   vyt+1 (30)
qt+1 =

G
 
bsat+1jt+2   (1  ^)  ^re + vmt+1   vyt+1 (31)
These equations show that movements of st+1 and qt+1 depend on shocks to money
and income, vmt+1 vyt+1, as well as on movements of bsatjt+1, regardless of whether they
arise from revisions of forecasting strategies or from shocks to the causal variables,
vxt+1. As with sticky prices, the equations show that parallel movements of st and qt
require a modest secular trend in goods prices and that the relative magnitude of =
matters. Again, if  is small relative to , then a movement in bsatjt+1 or a shock to
money or income will lead to a movement in st that is large relative to the movement
in pt (see equation 21) and thus, is associated with a near-parallel movement in qt. In
the limit, as  ! 0, the impact of changes in bsatjt+1 on pt approaches zero. Thus, if
excess demand in the goods markets is not sensitive to the real exchange rate, which is
what the evidence indicates, then the monetary model with fully exible goods prices
generates near-parallel movements in nominal and real exchange rates.
3.4 Currency Swings and Flexible Goods Prices
As with de-linking and near-parallel movements, the ability of the monetary model with
imperfect knowledge to generate currency swings away from PPP does not require the
assumption of sticky goods prices. Again, this is because currency swings arise from
the impact of forecasting behavior on the steady-state component of the model.
To highlight this result, we examine the implication of currency swings under the as-
sumption of fully exible goods prices.41 Equations (20) and (22) show that the ability
40Empirical evidence shows that over the short-term, real exchange rate movements are associated
with small substitution e¤ects. See Meade (1981), Mo¤et (1989), Marquez (1991), and Hooper and
Marquez (1995). The VAR estimates in Johansen et al. (2008) and Frydman et al. (2008) indicate
that  is roughly :01.
41For the case of sticky goods prices, see chapter 14 of Frydman and Goldberg (2007).
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of the model to generate currency swings depends on the behavior of
bsatjt+1   bsreatjt+1:
qt =

G

bsatjt+1  bsreatjt+1 (32)
If, for example, revisions of forecasting strategies and movements in the causal variables
led to a tendency for bsatjt+1 to rise relative to bsreatjt+1 over some extended period of time,
that is,

bsatjt+1  bsreatjt+1 > 0, then st and qt would also tend to rise over that period.
Moreover, such a swing in st and qt would end once the swing in individualsforecasts
ended.
Thus, to model currency swings with the exible-price monetary model in equations
(1)-(4) and (14), we need to model movements in the aggregate of individualspoint
forecasts of the exchange rate. We continue to assume that xt follows a random walk
with constant drift. As for modeling ^t, it is useful to consider rst the implications
of imposing the invariance restriction, that is, setting ^t = 0 for all t.
3.4.1 An Unbounded Swing Away from PPP
With no revisions of forecasting strategies, the one-period change in individualspoint
forecasts is given by bsatjt+1 = ^x+ ^xt . The trend change in this aggregate forecast,
^x, is thus constant and, in general, di¤ers from the trend change that would be
obtained under REH, (1  ^) ^re. Consequently, the invariance restriction and a xed
money-growth rule, together with the assumption of imperfect knowledge imply that
individualspoint forecasts will tend to move in one direction or the other, relative tobsreatjt+1, endlessly
To see the implications of such behavior, suppose that this trend change in forecasts
is positive, so that E

bsatjt+1  bsreatjt+1 > 0 at every point in time. Equation (32)
shows that the trend change in the real exchange rate will also be positive and constant,
that is, qt will also tend to move up every period by the same magnitude without bound.
It is easy to see from equation (20) that st will also undergo an unbounded upswing.
Moreover, if the swings in qt and st were initially toward PPP, then these prices would
eventually shoot through this benchmark and begin trending away from parity from
the other side. Equation (23) shows that these swings in qt and st are associated
with corresponding swings in nominal and real interest rates and thus a breakdown of
international Fisher parity.
The analysis makes clear that such unbounded swings would arise in the model
even if we were to assume that market participantss forecasting strategies were based
21
solely on macroeconomic fundamentals. Indeed, an unbounded swing in st away from
parity would arise even if xt included only those fundamentals that drive the REH
forecast, that is, mt and yt. Thus, a currency swing away from PPP occurs in the
monetary model not because goods prices are sticky or market participants ignore
macroeconomic fundamentals in forming their forecasts, but because knowledge about
the causal mechanism driving exchange rates is imperfect.
3.4.2 Bounded Instability of Asset markets
Imperfect knowledge leads to de-linking, parallel movements, and an unbounded cur-
rency swing away from PPP. However, modeling imperfect knowledge with invariant
representations su¤ers from the same di¢ culties as REH models: both are unable to
explain the currency swings we actually observe and both presume gross irrationality.
Like in other asset markets, the exchange rate experience of the last three decades is
characterized by swings that, although protracted, are bounded and eventually reverse
themselves over subsequent time periods.
Equation (32) shows that to generate bounded swings in the monetary model, the
trend change in individualsforecasts must eventually switch direction. But, for this
to occur, the invariance restriction must be dropped: either individuals revise their
forecasting strategies or one or more of the drifts underpinning the causal variables shift
so as to change the sign of Et

bsatjt+1  bsreatjt+1. Moreover, to escape the presumption
that market participants are grossly irrational, we must stop short of fully prespecifying
revisions of forecasting strategies.42
In the next section, we continue to assume a xed policy environment, that is, the
drifts behind the causal variables are constants. This allows us to focus on modeling
revisions of forecasting strategies.
4 An IKE Representation of Forecasting Behavior
To model individualsforecasting behavior, Frydman and Goldberg (2007) explore the
implications of a well-documented phenomenon that psychologists call conservatism:
individuals tend to revise the ways that they form their beliefs about uncertain out-
comes gradually, relative to some baseline.43
While market participants may tend to behave conservatively, conservatism is a
42For a rogorous demonstration that jettisoning fully predetermined representations is required to
model currency uctuations without the presumption of irrationality see Frydmand and Goldberg
(2007, 2008).
43See Edwards (1968) and Shleifer (2000).
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regularity that is at best uneven and qualitative.44 ;45We would not expect an individual
to behave conservatively forever: eventually, the unfolding historical record on market
outcomes, changes in the social context, including policy, or the sheer creativity in
thinking about the future, may lead a market participant to revise her forecasting
strategy in a more substantial, non-conservative way. Moreover, in those periods when
an individual does behave conservatively, we would not expect her to do so in exactly
the same way across those periods.
The FG model represents these features of conservatism by placing qualitative con-
ditions on the representation in (14). In doing so, the model is able to account for
the swings we observe in currency markets, which are not only bounded, but, as with
conservatism, are also uneven in magnitude and duration. By imposing qualitative con-
ditions on forecasting behavior, the FG model is also able to represent the imperfection
of knowledge without the presumption that individuals are irrational.46
4.0.3 Conservatism as a Qualitative Regularity
How one would formalize conservatism depends on the context. In general, it requires
a specication of both the formation of beliefs and the baseline against which revisions
of those beliefs are judged.47
In the context of the FG model, the way in which an individual forms her beliefs
her forecast is represented by (14). Expression (16) species the change in this fore-
cast, which we rewrite as follows
bsa;itjt+1   bsa;it 1jt = ^itxit + Et 1 hbsa;itjt+1j^it = 0i+ ^itxit (33)
44This seems to be the case with other empirical ndings uncovered by behavioral economists. For
example, they report much evidence that participants in nancial markets often rely on technical
trading rules in deciding when to take open poisitons. However, there is also much evidence that the
importance individuals place on such strategies varies over time. See Schulmeister (2006, 2008) and
references therein. By contrast, we would expect that the regularities that characterize individuals
preferences for example, the importance of fairness or loss aversion in individual decision making
may be more enduring.
45Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) also appeal to conservatism in modeling an individuals
forecasting behavior. But, to generate sharp predictions, they formulate conservative behavior with a
xed rule that presumes that individuals under-react to earnings announcements in exactly the same
way at every point in time. Consequently, they presume that market participants forego obvious prot
opportunities endlessly.
46For a rigorous demonstration of how IKE models are able to avoid the presumption of irrationality,
see Frydman and Goldberg (2007, 2008).
47In Edwardss experiments, conservatism was dened as updating that is too slow relative to a
baseline dened by the updating associated with Bayesrule.
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We dene the baseline change as the updating that would occur if an individual decided
to leave her forecasting strategy unchanged. Such status quochange in the forecast
is given by Et 1
h
bsa;itjt+1j^it = 0i + ^ixit . Conservatism is then dened in terms of
the change of bsitjt+1 that arises from revisions of an individuals forecasting strategy,
relative to this status-quo change. Because the PPP puzzle is cast in terms of the
trends in goods prices and the real exchange rate, Frydman and Goldberg formalize
conservatism in terms of what they call the baseline drift, that is, the trend in the
status quo change, ^
i
t 1
xi :
The FG model makes use of two conservative conditions to represent how an indi-
vidual may revise her forecasting strategy. One of these conditions restricts revisions
of ^
i
t so that their impact on the level of bsa;itjt+1 is smaller in size than the baseline drift,
that is, ^itxit < t (34)
where jj denotes an absolute value and t =
^it 1xi is the magnitude of the baseline
drift.
A revision of ^
i
t at a point in time, say t =  , impacts not only the change in
an individuals forecast between    1 and  , but also the baseline change between 
and  + 1, that is, ^
i

xi. The second conservative condition restricts revisions of ^
i
t
so that the baseline drifts in two consecutive periods have the same sign. Given that
^
i
t
xi = ^
i
t 1
xi + ^
i
t
xi, the following condition ensures that if ^
i
t 1
xi implies an
upward or downward movement in bsa;itjt+1, so will ^itxi:^itxi < t (35)
The constraints (34) and (35) embody the idea that when an individual decides to
revise her strategy, she is reluctant to do so in ways that would alter the level or
baseline drift of her forecast too much from what would be associated with the status
quo change.
The baseline drift in FGs formulation of conservatism is the change that is produced
in standard models, which arises from the mere updating due to movements of causal
variables. Economists sometimes recognize that changes in causal variables may lead
to revisions of individualsforecasting strategies. But, when they do, they rely on pre-
existing rules, like Bayesformula. By contrast, the present IKE formulation recognizes
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that individuals do not endlessly obey pre-existing rules in deciding on when and how
to alter their forecasting strategies. Indeed, the decision to revise ones forecasting
strategy depends on many factors, including prior forecasting success, economic and
political developments, emotions, or, as we will suggest shortly, the size of the departure
of the exchange rate from PPP.
The conservative restrictions in (34) and (35) leave room for non-rule-based revi-
sions by restricting neither the causal variables that may enter the representation in
(14), nor how exactly these variables might matter. Moreover, they do not constrain
the trend change in an individuals forecast to be small in magnitude, only that this
change is conservative relative to the status quo, in which the causal variables drive
change. Consequently, if changes in the causal variables between two points in time
were large, the change in bsa;itjt+1 could also be large.
Nonetheless, the conservative restrictions in (34) and (35) place su¢ cient structure
on the analysis. Frydman and Goldberg (2007, 2008) show that any time period in
which the revisions of an individuals forecasting strategy are conservative and trends
in the causal variables remain unchanged, will be characterized by movements of bsa;itjt+1
that are, on average, in the same direction.
To see this, suppose that the baseline drift behind an individuals forecast is initially
positive between t =    1 and  , that is, ^i 1xi > 0. This positive drift implies
that if the individual decides to leave her forecasting strategy unchanged at  , so that
^
i
 = 0, her forecast will tend to rise between  1 and  . With imperfect knowledge,
however, an individual revises her strategy at least intermittently. Revisions can either
reinforce or impede the positive change in bsa;itjt+1 that is due to the movements of the
causal variables. But, if revisions satisfy the constraint in (34), their impact on bsa;itjt+1
will be smaller than that of the underlying drift and bsa;itjt+1 will tend to move up between
   1 and  .
The tendency of bsa;itjt+1 to rise may persist between  and  +1. The matter depends
partly on whether the baseline drift behind bsa;itjt+1 remains positive, that is, whether
^
i

xi > 0. But, if the revision of ^
i
 satises the constraint in (35), this will be
the case. Thus, if an individual revises her forecasting strategy at time  + 1 and
this revision satises the constraint in (34), the tendency of bsa;itjt+1 to rise will endure
between  and  + 1. Moreover, it is clear that this tendency for bsa;itjt+1 to rise will
persist as long as the revisions of individual is forecasting strategy are conservative,
as dened by the conditions in (34) and (35).
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4.1 Uneven and Bounded Long Swings
Findings in psychology suggest that individuals are often reluctant to revise their
decision-making strategies in dramatic ways. And macroeconomic fundamentals of-
ten trend in particular directions for years at a time. Consequently, the FG model
implies not only that the exchange rate will tend to undergo swings in one direction,
but that these swings may be quite protracted.
The key to the FG models ability to account for the type of long swings we observe
in currency markets is that it recognizes that conservatism is a qualitative regular-
ity whose duration is uneven; the model does not fully prespecify when and how long
market participants might behave conservatively. Allowing for the possibility that indi-
viduals abandon conservative revisions of their forecasts from time to time is important
for explaining the partial, but signicant countermovements that characterize currency
swings away from PPP: such movements begin and end because individuals revise their
forecasting strategies in non-conservative and non-reinforcing ways. More broadly, the
uneven nature of conservatism is crucial in accounting for the currency swings in gure
1, whose duration and magnitude are also uneven.
Moreover, because an IKE representation does not determine exactly when indi-
vidualsforecasting behavior may be adequately characterized by conservatism, it does
not determine exactly when an exchange rate swing might begin or end. This feature
enables the FG model to allow for both bulls and bears in the market at every point
in time and yet avoid the inconsistency problem that was identied by Robert Lucas
and that gave rise to the REH revolution.48
Although the FG model leaves open the exact timing of when an exchange rate
swing might begin or end, it does imply that swings away from PPP are self limiting:
eventually such periods are followed by sustained movements back in the direction of
parity. This implication follows partly from the models use of a new specication of
the premium on foreign exchange, which relates the risk of potential losses from specu-
lation not to the variance of foreign exchange returns, as is usually the case, but to the
gap between an individuals forecast of the exchange rate and its historical benchmark
level.49 With this specication of risk, the model continues to imply currency swings of
uneven duration and magnitude. However, while revisions of forecasting strategies and
48For a discussion of this issue, see Frydman and Goldberg (2007, 2008).
49This formulation of risk replaces the usual assumptions of risk aversion and expected utility
theory with endogenous prospect theory. Endogenous prospect theory provides a way to represent the
experimental ndings of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and others in a world of imperfect knowledge.
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trends in the causal variables may, for example, lead foreign exchange bulls to bid the
exchange rate further above PPP, they simultaneously become more concerned about
the capital losses that they would incur if a sustained counter-movement were to arise.
Moreover, if the swing away from PPP were to continue, bulls would eventually become
so concerned about a reversal that they would no longer revise their forecasting strate-
gies in conservative ways. At that point, they would either reduce their long positions
or abandon them altogether, which would precipitate a reversal in the exchange rate.50
5 A Large Half-Life of PPP Deviations
By recognizing imperfect knowledge, the FG model is able to account for near-parallel
movements of nominal and real exchange rates without requiring that goods prices
adjust unreasonably sluggishly to their market clearing levels. Indeed, this is the case
even if goods prices are assumed to be perfectly exible.
By sharp contrast to extant REH models, which imply near-I(1) behavior, the FG
model is also able to account for the long swings that we actually observe in currency
markets. Frydman, et al. (2008) show that the FG model implies a near-I(2) process
for the real exchange rate. This, in turn, implies that PPP deviations have a large half
life.
However, because REH models imply at most I(1) trends, extant empirical studies
of the half-life of PPP deviations are based mostly on estimating an AR(1) model:51
(qt   qppp) = (qt 1   qppp) + t (36)
where t white noise,  is estimated by OLS, and the half-life is given by
log(0:5)
log()
. The
properties of OLS estimates of  depend on the process generating qt   qppp. In the
context of the FG model with exible goods prices, this process is given by (22), which
we rewrite as follows:
(qt   qppp) = (qt 1   qppp) + t + "t (37)
50The implication of self-limiting swings also follows form the behavior of policy makers, who tend to
alter trends of policy variables when the exchange rate moves too far away from parity. See Frydman
and Goldberg (2007, chapter 14).
51Murray and Papell (2003) and Rossi (2003) estimate the half-life of the real exchange rate on the
basis of an autoregressive specication of order p > 1 and continue to nd a large half-life. Allowing
for higher-order AR processes would not change the conclusions in this section.
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where the drift is given by
t =

G

^txt + ^t 1
x   re

(38)
re = m   y, and "t depends on the error terms of the xt, mt, and yt processes.
We now show that if the real exchange rate process were adequately characterized
by our IKE-based monetary model, but an AR(1) model were used for estimation
nonetheless, one would indeed obtain an estimate of  close to unity, thereby implying
a large half life.
To introduce some notation, assume that we have a number, n, of long swings,
and we let 0 = T0 < T 1 < T

2 <    < T n = T denote the points of time at which
non-conservative revisions of forecasting strategies occur, leading to a change in the
direction of the long swing. Then Ti = T i   T i 1 denotes the length of the ith period,
Ii, of conservative behavior or the length of the ith long swing.
With imperfect knowledge, ^t is, in general, not zero and, thus, the drift t is
time varying. A swing away or toward PPP occurs during periods in which forecast
revisions satisfy the conservative conditions in (34) and (35). For example, we consider
the rst such period spanning t = 1; :::; T1 and rewrite the drift for any t during this
subperiod as
qt = t + "t = 1 + t; t = 1; : : : ; T1 (39)
where 1 = T 11
T1P
t=1
t is the average of the drifts during the rst period and t = t 1
denotes deviations from this average. More generally, we dene the average in period
i as
T 1i
X
t2Ii
(t + "t) = i + "i = i
and the deviations from the average,
t = t + "t   i + "i; t 2 Ii
The following assumptions are implied by conservative restrictions on revisions of
forecasting strategies and the fact that the observed swings in the exchange rate are
long:
Assumption 1: We assume that the deviations t are small in the sense that
 2i T
 1
i
P
t2Ii 
2
t is small.
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Assumption 2: We assume that the swings are long in the sense that Ti are large.
Assumption 1 follows from the conservative conditions in (34) and (35), which imply
that inside a period of conservatism, there is no change in the sign of the trend in the
real exchange rate. Consequently, during those periods, the variation of t is small
compared to the average trend. Assumption 2 merely says that the currency swings
are long-lasting, for example, the 2-4 years that is actually observed would be su¢ cient
for our result.
We show in the appendix that under assumptions 1 and 2, the OLS estimate of the
root in equation (36) ^OLS ! 1, thereby implying that estimates of the half-life will
tend to be large.
6 The IKE Resolution of the Puzzle and Empirical Implica-
tions
The IKE monetary model of currency swings resolves the PPP puzzle by according
market participantsforecasts an autonomous role in driving outcomes. In doing so,
REHs rigid connection between individualsexchange rate forecasts and PPP is sev-
ered. This enables us to de-link real exchange rate movements from the adjustment
of goods prices and generate enough persistence to account for the long-lasting swings
and large half lives that characterize oating currencies.
Despite the qualitative nature of the constraints that it uses to represent forecasting
behavior, the FG model not only resolves the PPP puzzle, but it generates other
testable implications. Frydman et al. (2008) provide empirical support for our IKE
resolution of the PPP puzzle by testing key implications of FG model against those of
its REH counterpart. We have already discussed how, in the context of the traditional
monetary model, IKE and REH lead to di¤ering implications for time series data:
under IKE, qt is near-I(2) and the half-life of qt is not tied to the speed of adjustment
in goods markets, whereas under REH, qt is at most near-I(1) and pt and qt tend
to converge to PPP at the same rate. Frydman et al.s (2008) VAR analysis rejects
the implications of the model under REH in favor of those under IKE at very high
signicance levels.
Frydman et al. (2008) also show that whereas the real exchange rate and real in-
terest rate di¤erential are separately near-I(2) under IKE, goods market equilibrium
implies that these variables co-move over time; as forecasting behavior leads to long-
lasting swings in the nominal exchange rate, goods prices adjust so as to imply a
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cointegrating relationship between qt and it   ^t. By contrast, the monetary model
under REH implies that PPP and international Fisher parity are individually cointe-
grating relationships. Our VAR analysis rejects that qt and it   ^t are separately I(0),
in favor of the alternative hypothesis that they are near-I(2) and cointegrated.52
52The VAR studies of Juselius (1995) and Juselius and MacDonald (2004) also nd that the real
exchange rate and the real interest rate di¤erential are individually non-stationary and cointegrated.
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Appendix
A regression of qt on qt 1 and a constant gives the regression coe¢ cient
^OLS =
PT
t=1 qt(qt 1   qT )PT
t=1(qt 1   qT )2
= 1 +
PT
t=1qt(qt 1   qT )PT
t=1(qt 1   qT )2
=1 +
PT
t=1qtqt 1   (qT   q0)qTPT
t=1 q
2
t 1   T q2T
;
where qT = T 1
PT
t=1 qt 1. We note from the identity
TX
t=1
(
t 1X
i=1
i)t =
1
2
[(
TX
t=1
t)
2  
TX
t=1
2t ]
that
TX
t=1
qt 1qt =
1
2
[(
TX
t=1
qt)
2  
TX
t=1
(qt)
2] =
1
2
[(qT   q0)2  
TX
t=1
(qt)
2]:
We then nd because
P
t2Ii t = 0, that
qt =
i 1X
j=1
Tiai + (t  T i 1)ai +
X
s2Ii;st
s
which can be well approximated by
q0t =
i 1X
j=1
Tiai + (t  T i 1)ai
since i is small compared to ai, according to Assumption 1. We next nd after some
algebra
TX
t=1
q0t =
nX
i=1
Ti[
i 1X
j=1
jTj +
1
2
(Ti + 1)ai];
TX
t=1
(q0t )
2=
nX
i=1
a2i
Ti(Ti + 1)(2Ti + 1)
6
+
nX
1=1
(
i 1X
j=1
jTj)(
i 1X
j=1
jTj + ai(Ti + 1))Ti:
It is seen that q0T is linear in Ti,
PT
t=1 q
0
t is quadratic, and
PT
t=1(q
0
t )
2 is cubic in Ti.
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Therefore, the denominator of ^OLS   1 is of the order of T 3i and the numerator is of
the order of T 2i , so the ratio will be small if the lengths of the swing periods Ti are
large.
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